

REPORT ON THE 2005 ZIMBABWE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

ASSESSED USING THE SADC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES GOVERNING DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

About the consortium

The consortium issuing this report comprises the South African Council of Churches, the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, SANGOCO, Idasa, the Centre for Policy Studies and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. The consortium formed in 2004 and requested but was not afforded observer status. Members of the consortium did visit the country prior to and during the elections. They consulted widely with NGO and political groupings in Zimbabwe, interviewed a cross-section of Zimbabweans and followed the election process both from within and outside of the country. All members have longstanding programme partnerships in Zimbabwe.

The Mandate

The project to deploy regional civil society observers (in short known as the Zimbabwe Observer Mission) arose as a result of a joint conference held by South African and Zimbabwean civil society organisations on the elections in Zimbabwe held at the Burgers Park hotel, Pretoria on 4-5 October 2004. At that event, convened by some of the consortium members, a commitment was made to all participants that a team of regional civil society observers would be fielded. The convenors were severely criticised for not taking a very firm position on what was already appearing to be an inimical climate for elections. Instead they pointed to the recently signed SADC election guidelines as a possible opportunity and at the very least, a consensual election adjudication framework. They were also concerned to assist in reducing possible violence through their presence in the country and through a series of fact-finding visits, to encourage Zimbabweans to commit to a peaceful and fair election.

Accreditation

Until Tuesday March 22, the consortium continued to seek a formal invitation from the Zimbabwe government to field accredited observers. On Thursday 24th March the consortium made a further intervention with the Zimbabwean Ambassador to South Africa and was led to believe that the matter was still pending. Given this ambiguous state of affairs, the consortium decided to scale back from a 50-member delegation to a small election week team who would witness the election in Zimbabwe.

This report is therefore a summary of impressions and findings based on a period of observation and research spent in Zimbabwe as follows:

- Five fact-finding missions that visited Zimbabwe in February and March 2005
- A three person medium term observer team that spent 28 days in Zimbabwe ahead of the elections
- An eleven (11) person poll watcher team backed by Zimbabwean support staff.

The report consists of both a general overview of the elections and an assessment of adherence to the “SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections”.

Statements issued by the consortium and its leadership at various stages in the process are appended.

Election Observation

The conduct of a transparent and open election process in accordance with established legislation is fundamental to a democratic society. Political participation is important not only for the immediate election process, but also is a basic right enshrined in many constitutions either directly or through such rights as freedom of expression, movement, peaceful assembly and association. Political rights and democratic elections are firmly entrenched as fundamental tenets of African governance and development.

In recent years, the observation of elections has emerged as an important task in support of democratic consolidation and universal human rights. This expansion of election monitoring and observation efforts is directly related to the corresponding global trend toward democratisation. Election observation is therefore more than just a technical exercise, as it can also contribute directly to the promotion and protection of universal human rights.

As in other parts of the world, election observation has also become an integral part of the electoral process in the countries of the SADC region. In this regard, observers have already played a significant role in enhancing the transparency and credibility of elections and the acceptance of results.

As a sign of their continued commitment to the ideals of promoting the development of democratic institutions and practices and encouraging the observance of universal human rights, the SADC member states have adopted the “SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections” as an instrument against which the actions of the members can be measured. Not only does this document provide guidelines for the holding of elections, it also recognises and entrenches the role of international observers, especially from SADC, in the election process and provides a practical code of conduct for election observers.

The consortium adopted the SADC principles and guidelines governing democratic elections as a framework for their observations. The elections in Zimbabwe were thus assessed using the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections which have been signed by Zimbabwe itself.

Election observation is not a one-day event. Elections at the very least have three distinct stages that each provide the observer with specific challenges and criteria. For this reason, the challenges imposed by non-accreditation notwithstanding, the consortium covered all three phases of the election process i.e. pre-election, election and post-election.

“Free and fair”

The consortium did not intend to make use of the now controversial terminology “free and fair”. Despite this slogan having been severely criticised in African conferences on election observation as far too simplistic a judgement, it was ironically used by some international observers as though it provides a validation which should be automatically accepted by the citizens of Zimbabwe. At the very least, observers

should note that best electoral behaviour and the legal system in Zimbabwe make allowance for judicial review of results, and that losers have every right to question the result. But because this mantra has been invoked, it is important to reflect on the phrase. Without going into the detail which can be found in any cursory review of the literature, the concept refers to two essential components of an election. There should be free political activity untrammelled by repressive laws, intimidation, violence or restriction on contestants and citizens in their discussion of politics or their access to information which would enable that discussion to be an informed one. A free election allows individuals to make up their mind without restriction. A fair election on the other hand has been best described as one in which “the playing field is level” and the referee unbiased.

Early practical knowledge on this concept was evolved in the liberation election of South West Africa/Namibia. It was designed to protect a vulnerable people against abuse by a state in which the incumbent was clinging to power.

It is disingenuous in the extreme to suggest that a free and fair election is one in which there is no violence and people can get to the polling station to vote. Given that this judgement was made by people who should know better, it is understandable that Zimbabweans are deeply suspicious of the motives of these groups.

FINDINGS

Following general remarks introduced from the checklist prepared by the consortium for their team members and appended to this report, we will summarise observations made by team members in Zimbabwe in election week. These are linked directly to the criteria accepted by Zimbabwe and on the basis of which they made various amendments to their laws and election procedures intended to comply with these criteria as interpreted by the ZANU PF government.

In summary, the parliamentary elections were held on March 31, 2005. The announced result gave ZANU PF 78 seats (and about 56% of the popular vote) and the MDC 41 seats (43%). 1 independent was returned. In the final two weeks before election day, public space opened up with domestic civil society groups given permission to conduct voter education, the opposition party able to campaign in previously no-go areas, and the international press able to travel freely and report through their media, few of which were available to local Zimbabweans. Brief access was given to the opposition party in the state media, and independent newspapers appeared on the streets of the city. All these were gifts not rights – legislation restricting political rights has not been amended.

Election day was peaceful and voting proceeded efficiently. Results were, on the other hand, announced slowly and there are discrepancies in the various figures announced. On April 2 and again on April 6 the official opposition declared the elections to have been fraudulent.

Although it is not yet clear what this means for Zimbabwe, at the very least it demonstrates that the contested legitimacy of the past five years has not been resolved by this parliamentary election.

The Pre-Election Phase

This phase includes preparation for an election, most of which is conducted before an election is officially promulgated. During the period from which an election is promulgated – in Zimbabwe on 31 January - observers should be focused on Election Administration and Election Campaigning. Election administration is primarily concerned with ensuring that the necessary legal and administrative framework exists to ensure that the maximum numbers of eligible citizens are able to vote. On the other hand the election campaign element is concerned with ensuring that the basic freedoms of expression, movement and association are respected during the run-up to Election Day.

Election Administration

The National Election Administration Body (EMB)

A National Election Administration Body, such as an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), is usually assigned to administer an election. In Zimbabwe it is difficult to tell which body is responsible for elections as they have a number of bodies which include;

1. The Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) - a constitutional body that supervises the other bodies
2. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) – a statutory body (established on 20 January 2005) “in charge of elections”
3. The National Logistics Committee - a body comprising mostly institutions and individuals from the discredited and disbanded elections directorate responsible for “logistics for the elections”
4. The Delimitation Commission – a constitutional body “responsible for demarcation of electoral boundaries.”
5. The Registrar General (registrar of elections) – responsible for the registration of voters

Voter and Civic Education

Sufficient voter and civic education is needed to ensure that participants in the election process are fully informed of their rights and responsibilities as voters. In general, voter education is focused on a particular election and should inform voters of when, how and where to vote, while civic education is a longer term process, which seeks to educate citizens on the fundamentals of democratic society and civic responsibility.

There was very little voter education that was undertaken. This was largely due to the new electoral law that forbids civil society voter education unless sanctioned by the ZEC. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network was granted permission only two weeks before the election despite large changes in electoral regulations, and the ZEC itself had no capacity or time to conduct its own programme.

Delimitation/Demarcation

The delimitation process is a technical exercise that can easily be used to achieve political goals.

The Delimitation Commission appointed by the State President relies on information provided by the discredited offices of the Registrar General. According to the commission, there appears to be an urban to rural migration in Zimbabwe as the metropolitan provinces of Harare and Bulawayo lost three constituencies to the rural areas. The opposition and independent observers point to gerrymandering – the construction of constituencies designed to favour a particular party through the incorporation of particular voter populations or to unduly weight the votes of such a population.

In addition, the re-delimitation of constituencies, particularly in urban areas, made the casting of a vote a difficult process for some. Citizens appeared at the polling station at which they have cast their vote for the last twenty five years only to find that they were not on the voters roll for that constituency as the boundaries had changed. In most instances, they were advised of alternate polling stations at which to cast their votes. However, the impact of not finding oneself on the voters roll and the difficulty, for some, of arriving at a correct polling station in time to vote, should not be underestimated

Voter Registration

The purpose of voter registration is to identify those persons who are eligible to cast a ballot on Election Day. The guiding principle is that voter registration should promote broad participation and should not inhibit the participation of eligible voters. It is, therefore, of paramount importance to ensure that no unreasonable restrictions are placed on voter registration.

Onerous restrictions other than a birth certificate and or identity document (like proof of residence) were placed on Zimbabweans wanting to be on the voters' roll. Those without the recognised documents or the inability to obtain proof of residence details from unwilling local authorities were disenfranchised. In addition, there was significant disenfranchisement of Zimbabwean citizens and residents inside the country on the basis of their ancestry. The tool used was the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2001. The act denies the right of franchise to anyone who was or whose parents were born outside of the country unless they had renounced said citizenship through a costly and difficult process. Zimbabweans resident outside the country were generally not able to register. Those who are registered but have not been resident for more than 12 months are not allowed to vote even if they can return to do so.

Election Campaign

The Political Campaign Process

The success of the political campaign process is completely dependent on the creation of a political environment that assures freedom of expression, assembly and association. During this period, candidates should be in a position to exploit the above-mentioned freedoms in order to convey their respective programmes and agendas to as wide an audience as possible.

In Zimbabwe, political space for the opposition was only opened three weeks before the election. Prior to this, the Public Order and security Act (POSA) was misapplied

by the Zimbabwe Police to require and then refuse permission for meetings and to break up those that convened only after giving the requisite notice.

Campaign Resources

An effective campaign requires sufficient funds. In Zimbabwe parties can obtain funds from private sources and receive a small public fund based on the number of seats held.

A few weeks before the election government disbursed funds to both ZANU PF and the MDC. It is impossible to miss the extent to which ZANU PF made use of state resources to prosecute its campaign and both treat and threaten voters.

The Media

The very basis of democratic governance requires that the electorate be able to make informed decisions. This demands that all contesting points of view be fairly and equitably communicated, especially in the media. The media's ability to play this role hinges on three equally important and interrelated aspects. Firstly, there is the degree to which the media is able to function freely during the electoral process. Secondly, there is the issue of broadcast access that is provided to the respective candidates, and finally, there is the issue of unbiased coverage by the respective media outlets.

The Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) limit citizens' access to the independent media. The government maintains a tight grip on the media and controls both the inflow and outflow of news. Although some attempt was made at giving the opposition some space, it was too little - ZANU PF got more than 90% of available airtime on state owned media outlets; and much too late – access was only given to the MDC in the last three weeks.

Independent papers obtained judicial relief from legislation which had prevented their appearance on the streets and did appear in the days running up to election day.

Political Violence and Intimidation

There can only be free, fair, credible and legitimate elections in a climate that is free of political violence and intimidation. The security forces are expected to play an extremely prominent role in maintaining the integrity of the process.

Politically motivated violence diminished rapidly in the run up to the election, confirming the view that it is possible to 'turn it off' and it is not merely a factor of internecine community strife or party political intolerance. While election week was peaceful, reports of widespread threats to those who voted for the wrong party, sporadic violence in previous weeks, and the unresolved political polarisation and party intolerance left people cowed and suspicious. Even the introduced queue and vote management systems served to intimidate those who had previous experience of state sponsored violence and abuse, and were suspicious whether their vote would be secret..

THE ELECTION PHASE

Vote Counting

The vote count is a crucial stage in the election. In the absence of a substantial technical international observer team, the consortium was concerned that there was no comprehensive and statistically reliable mechanism for verification of the announced results. Whilst the MDC had a system based on a sampling of constituencies and largely designed to red-light anomalies which might indicate vote rigging through ballot box stuffing it was not sufficient for tracking votes. It required good communications from the 100 trained trackers whom they planned to field; and it required ongoing access to MDC polling agents during vote tallying at polling stations.

The two most significant domestic civil society observer groups were set up for incident tracking and for noting polling station tallies reported by their stationary observers. In the case of ZESN, it was intended that these observers would observe and record the count. Because no domestic group fielded observers in every polling station for every hour of voting or counting and the same is true for the political parties, it was not possible for them to provide a comprehensive and statistically reliable verification of the announced results.

The official results centre was based at the Harare International Conference Centre (HICC) on the first floor. The centre was for the best part of the election period almost deserted, and had a desultory air about it. Three hours after polling opened it was still being established. On Saturday, the three large screens showing digitally projected results maps were watched over by a few security guards. Nevertheless, announcements of the results were done from this centre by ZEC commissioners hosted by a ZTV continuity announcer and these were broadcast on ZTV and state owned radio.

From the moment when polling stations completed their vote tallying and the results were radioed upwards by police radio or ferried to constituency centres until the result was announced – with the first results being announced 11 hours after close of voting – it is entirely unclear what tabulation, verification and auditing procedure was adopted, where it happened and who, if anybody, other than state officials, monitored or observed this. Furthermore, the procedure adopted at polling stations, which became local counting stations, was that those deemed correctly accredited, were locked in not merely until the tally was completed but until the result was announced. No communication was possible during this period and any parallel count systems relying on access to tally sheets and communication from local polling stations was severely undermined.

This is only one of a number of “black boxes” (places where whatever happens cannot be observed) in the process which starts with the printing of ballot papers and ends with their auditing and the announcement of results. The lack of transparency will undermine, and indeed has undermined confidence in the outcome and has resulted in rumour and gossip. The integrity of the election is compromised, and the promise of Election Day – and of the well behaved voters and officials – blighted.

The court findings of this week in the United Kingdom that there was intentional election fraud being perpetrated within the postal vote system must alert all those involved in the elections in Zimbabwe to the inherent temptations for fraud in a postal or early voting system. Many jurisdictions have severely limited these precisely

because of the difficulty of monitoring intimidation and fraud. So it is unfortunate that this also was a 'black box'. Very few people are able to say how many early votes were cast. Similarly information on how decisions were made about which ballot papers were used, how they were collected and subsequently entered into the counting system (some even suggested a party based ballot paper, which can clearly not have been countenanced) was scant. These votes may well explain some of the discrepancies between reported turnouts and results (see below), but if they were indeed of such substantial numbers then any block voting or decisions to introduce the ballots into 'swing' constituencies could have major impacts on the results.

THE POST-ELECTION PHASE

Announcement of Overall Results

In most SADC countries, the EMB is responsible for officially announcing the election results. Official publication of complete results by polling stations in a set period of time after Election Day enables a detailed verification process and can enhance public confidence in the outcome of the election. Any undue delay or discrepancies concerning the aggregation, verification and the announcement of the final result should, therefore, be noted.

There was no obvious supervision of the aggregation, verification and final result tabulation. Information on the processing of result remains hazy and clouded in secrecy. In most cases results were only published at the national command centre – from whence they come, nobody really knows.

On the day of release of this report the Herald newspaper is reporting an explanation by the ZEC of the discrepancies between Election Day records of the number of ballots casts and the final results. There is a discrepancy of over 200 000 between the officially announced turn out figures and the officially announced results. The MDC has noted that in some 30 constituencies, this discrepancy is greater than the winning margin of ZANU PF. The explanation is that the turn out figures were indicative only and that they should not be seen as official – unfortunately this explanation merely demonstrates that the ZEC had not established high levels of integrity and professionalism in its management of the election process. This was essential given the experience of previous elections and the recommendations of observer groups (including the official South African delegation) following those elections.

It does not ultimately matter what international observers say. It is what Zimbabweans believe which counts. And just as only a small number of people need to lose confidence in the ability of their bank to pay them their deposits in order to start a 'run on the bank', so only a limited number of people need to lose faith in the currency of their vote in order to undermine the legitimacy of the elected government. There are two ways to overcome these suspicions – the tally sheets of every polling station in a constituency, signed, dated and timed by polling agents and observers must be tabulated publicly and compared with the result, or the votes from the ballot boxes sealed and signed in the presence of the same agents must be recounted. It is not the purpose of this report to suggest that either of these be undertaken, but merely to point to the logistical difficulty of proving that there was no error or fraud.

Conclusion

When large official opposition parties declare the elections to have been a fraud, as did the MDC on Saturday April 2 at 14:00, there will be those who accuse them

merely of being sore losers. But their accusations cannot be wished away. It is manifestly not true that the people have spoken if a significant faction of the society is dissatisfied. It is the responsibility of the election authorities to do everything in their power to build sufficient trust in a fair election; and it is the responsibility of the government of the day in collaboration with its citizens to create a free political environment so that even the losers will accept their losses with good grace and continue to participate in building a peaceful and prosperous society. Unfortunately this has not happened in Zimbabwe. It is sincerely hoped that this will be possible in the near future for everybody's sake.

Zimbabwe's adherence to the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections

Guideline 1

Constitutional and legal guarantees of freedom of rights of the citizens

- ☒ A wide range of legal measures negatively impact on the freedom of citizens, including political freedoms.
- ☒ There are prohibitions on meetings, dissemination of information, and through the legacy of overt violence and intimidation, freedom of association is affected.
- ☒ POSA and AIPPA are two core legal instruments prohibitive of freedoms and rights of the citizens. Even if the proposed NGO Act has not yet been signed by the President, the threat of the Act prompts NGOs to exercise self-censorship and limit their activities.
- ☒ There is common recognition that the executive has too much power – including the power to interfere in the electoral process, and to generate a political environment that could cancel out attempted positive steps by several of the electoral management bodies.

Guideline 2

Conducive environment for free, fair and peaceful elections

- ☒ The legal measures mentioned under (1) directly and indirectly compromise the space for free, fair and peaceful elections.
- ☒ Both the security agents and the youth militia (youth forces of ZANU PF) have an intimidating influence on citizens and voters.
- ☒ Media coverage of the political parties widely diverges, with much more extensive television and radio coverage (also much more sympathetic coverage) of the governing party than of the opposition parties. Press coverage also restricts the opposition. There was no independent newspaper available until just before election day. Independent radio broadcasts on short wave were jammed.
- ☒ Violence and intimidation receded in the run-up to the elections. Even opposition parties and candidates spoke about the relative space for rallies opening up in former no-go areas. Yet, across the board, non-ZANU PF voters and analysts refer to the pervasive presence of subtle levels of intimidation – carried by the memory of previous instances of abuse, as well as by the threat of denial of access to food.
- ☒ The secrecy of the vote is not specifically addressed in the SADC guidelines. Perhaps it is taken for granted. However in this case it must be highlighted. Many Zimbabweans spoke of threats to the secrecy of the vote. For example, voters were told that their ballot crosses would be visible because of the transparency / translucency of the ballot boxes; and that the computers donated by the president to schools would be used to watch the voters. In addition, the new system used during the polls was not properly communicated to citizens before the elections and could have intimidated voters into believing the threats.
- ☒ Access to venues for opposition campaigns was also a contentious issue. The MDC candidate for Mudzi East alleged that he was denied access to venues. Interestingly venues here were made available for ZANU PF rallies.
- ☒ Contentious demarcation of constituencies also affected the potential free and fair nature of the elections.
- ☒ There was very little voter education that could be undertaken. This was largely due to delays in permission being granted by the Zimbabwe election commission.

Guideline 3

Non-discrimination in voters' registration

- ☒ There was a widely reported lack of updating of the voters' roll. There appears to be no systematic mechanism to remove deceased voters from the roll
- ☒ There was no effort to systematically ensure that all citizens – without qualification - would be on the voters' roll
- ☒ The Citizenship Amendment Act of 2001 has contributed to systematic widespread racial and ethnic discrimination in the registering of voters since its inception

Guideline 4

Existence of updates and accessible voters' roll

- ☒ There was equally a widely reported lack of availability of the voters' roll for inspection. A high fee payable for copies of the voters roll made it virtually impossible for non-government organisations to gain access.
- ☒ The Registrar General also refused to supply the opposition with an electronic version of the voters' roll which inhibited their ability to check it or use it for reaching out to voters. The registrar general did make available paper versions of the roll.
- ☒ Evidence of the inadequacy of the voters' roll was found across Zimbabwe on polling day, when high proportions – at times as high as 25% of voters arriving to vote at a particular polling station - was turned away. Across the country the 'turn away' figure fluctuated between 5 and 10 percent.
- ☒ The 'electoral management architecture' allowed multiple bodies to divide responsibility for interrelated election planning and management functions

Guideline 5

Timeous announcement of election date

- ☒ The election date – much a subject of speculation and debate - was regarded to have been announced according to provisions of the law.

Guideline 6

Transparent funding of political parties

- ☒ Political parties derive some of their funding from public sources; according to strength of parliamentary representation. Both major parties therefore had access to this source.
- ☒ There is also significant non-transparency of party funding – both on the side of ZANU PF and the MDC. ZANU PF has widespread access to (and makes extensive use of) state sources. This includes extensive use of the public media, and, for example, the commandeering of public assets for private use. Furthermore, the President's office budget is not subject to audit and is allegedly used by both the CIO and the party's election operations.
- ☒ The MDC, in turn, appeared to mainly rely on the public funding to which it has access. (In the past, it had access to relatively generous donor funding. No definitive information on the current situation was available.)
- ☒ The differential access to funding and state resources was also evident in the television advertisements that the two parties ran. ZBC-TV and state owned

newspapers carried predominantly ZANU PF adverts, and these were strategically placed at crucial moments of news and current affairs programmes. The costs of advertisements on television were prohibitively high.

Guideline 7

Polling stations should be in neutral places

- ☒ There is multiple-source recording of polling stations often not being in neutral places. ZESN published a list of 25 suspect polling stations. ZESN expressed the fear that these locations of stations would compromise the secrecy of the vote.
- ☒ Many new polling stations were established, and there was criticism that many were placed near residential areas newly incorporated into constituencies (see above on gerrymandering).

Guideline 8

Counting of votes at polling stations

- ☒ The election complied with this SADC condition.
- ☒ However, there was obfuscation of the exact counting process, with contradictory reports on where the polling station votes would be relayed to, and where the collation would take place.
- ☒ Results were not in all cases communicated by the election officials who handed them over to the police for onward transmission on police radio systems
- ☒ In the absence of an explanation to the contrary, it appears as if collation of the results was done by an unannounced set up outside of that made visible to observers.
- ☒ Collated results show a wide range of discrepancies between votes recorded as cast and signed for by the polling agents, and the totals released by the electoral authorities.
- ☒ The main opposition party did not receive information from the electoral authorities as to where and how the postal votes would be counted

Guideline 9

Establishment of the mechanism for assisting the planning and deployment of electoral observation missions

- ☒ Invitations were issued by the Zimbabwe government to selected government agencies and church bodies to deploy international observers.
- ☒ Domestic observers received invitations but their individual observer lists were vetted.
- ☒ There were some administrative problems but in the main those who were invited were accredited and able to deploy. However, a number of agencies were not invited. This included those who have routinely been invited by other countries in the region such as EISA and SADC Parliamentary Forum as well as our own civil society consortium.

Guideline 10

Deployment of SADC election observation missions at least two weeks before the voting day

- ☒ The SADC observer mission did make this formal cut-off point. However, late invitation and mobilisation and inability of SADC member states to financially

support their missions, led to partial late deployment and continuously low mission numbers.

- ☒ The various international observer missions from SADC governments and the African Union were not able to provide full coverage either of polling stations or of constituency and national election sites. Many places reported seeing no regional observers.

Conclusion

Public statements based on the observations summarised in this report and the individual reports made by members of the team operating in and around Harare and Bulawayo have been issued. Members of the team have been encouraged to publicise their personal experiences and will be doing so. The report does not contain recommendations for action by the members of the consortium or their partners in Zimbabwe. It is intended that we will be continuing to reflect on, and observe the reaction to, the election so that any future actions ensure that Zimbabweans do not have a future election under the conditions presently prevailing in the country. It is not fair to them, and will do no good for their prosperity and development or that of the region in which they are such an important country historically and strategically.

Pretoria 8th April 2005.