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The following is an unauthorized version of the Report of the Panel of Experts to the United Nations on Sierra Leone.
This is not the official report. The official report has not yet been released. The report posted here is subject to change by the sanctions committee.

 

ANNEX 2

MEETINGS AND CONSULTATIONS

 BELGIUM
 BURKINA FASO
 CANADA
 COTE D'IVOIRE
 FRANCE
GHANA
 GUINEA
 INDIA
 ISRAEL
 KENYA
 LIBERIA
 NIGER
 MALI

NIGERIA

SENEGAL
 SIERRA LEONE
 SOUTH AFRICA
 Other

Participation in Inter-ministerial Meeting on Conflict Diamonds gave Panel members access to a wide range of government and private sector firms from Africa, Europe, Israel and North America.

The Panel also participated in an Air Transport Sector Workshop: Controlling the Movement of Illicit Goods, attended by a wide range of experts from civil aviation and South Africa agencies, including the National Anti-Corruption Unit, Air Traffic and Navigation Services and the National Inter-Departmental Structure. The workshop was organised by Saferworld (U.K.) and the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria

 
SPAIN
 SWITZERLAND
 UKRAINE
 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

 UNITED KINGDOM
 THE UNITED STATES
 INDIVIDUALS

Note: Given the sensitive nature of the subjects being investigated by the Panel, many individuals spoke under conditions of confidentiality. Several interviews have therefore not been noted.

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANNEX 3

KEY FIGURES IN THE RUF

Many of the RUF leaders have been given, or have given themselves high-ranking military titles and nicknames or aliases. As many of them are known mainly by the latter, the report has occasionally used these as well as real names, where known. The following are some of the main RUF leaders.

Foday Saybana Sankoh, Chairman of the RUF; currently in prison in Sierra Leone

General Issa H. Sesay, formerly Brigadier, then Battlefield Commander; currently Interim Head of the RUF

Brigadier-General Maurice Kallon; currently heading the northern axis of the RUF

Brigadier Dennis Mingo (alias 'Superman'), Battle Group Commander, latterly Battle Commander, Lunsar Axis; currently fighting with the RUF

Lt. Col. Gibril Massaquoi, latterly Foday Sankoh's personal assistant; currently acting as RUF Spokesman behind RUF lines

Major-General Sam Bockarie (alias 'Mosquito'), former Battle Group Commander and 'High Command'; currently in exile in Liberia

Colonel Boston Flamoh or Flomoh (alias 'Rambo'); killed by RUF comrades in Makeni

Brigadier Mike Lamin, formerly Chief Intelligence Officer; Minister of Trade and Industries until May 2000; currently in prison in Freetown

Eldred Collins, Public Relations Officer, RUF Party; currently in prison in Freetown

General Ibrahim Bah, a Burkinabe, possibly of Gambian origin; senior logistics expert in the movement of weapons and diamonds between Burkina Faso, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Also known as Ibrahima Baldé and Baldé Ibrahima.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANNEX 5

 

LIST OF PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS PROVIDED BY SIERRA LEONE AIRPORTS AUTHORITY

Drawbacks in Detecting Diamonds and Arms Smuggling Through the Airports
  1. No equipment available to detect diamonds or arms.
  2. Security personnel screening passengers not properly trained in diamonds and arms detection.
  3. Coordination between various security agencies, viz: airport security, police, UNAMSIL, SLA etc. very inadequate and the sheer numbers represented make the process counter-productive.
  4. Social aspects of state security personnel exposes them to temptation; e.g. very low salaries and allowances, poor IQs, poor education, little exposure, etc.
  5. VIP protocol and escort extended by state security personnel to too many classes of people, e.g. ministers, parliamentarians, judges, army and police officers, corporate executives, diplomats, etc.
  6. Poor integrity of many state security and customs personnel, who use the privilege of their position to directly facilitate smuggling for personal benefit.
  7. No facilities for detecting unauthorized aircraft landing elsewhere other than Lungi and Hastings airports.
  8. Direct disloyalty of some state security and customs personnel who intentionally facilitate smuggling in order to promote the course of saboteurs and dissidents of the government.

Recommendations
  1. To strengthen the aspect of coordination and control by the SLAA through the provision of equipment such as:
    1. X-ray baggage screening equipment (high resolutions) for both Lungi and Hastings Airports;
    2. Surveillance radar equipment at Lungi Airport with a coverage of low altitudes;
    3. Air-to-ground and ground-to-ground state-of-the-art VHF and HF communication equipment to be installed at Lungi, Hastings, Bo and Kenema Airports;
    4. Appropriate training of SLAA personnel in Security, ATC and operations management.
  2. To properly screen all state security and customs personnel deployed at the airport to ensure integrity, loyalty, education, intelligence and character.
  3. To provide induction courses and appropriate training for all state security and customs personnel on the detection of diamonds, arms, laws relating to international smuggling, etc.
  4. Substantially improve the remuneration of all personnel charged with the responsibility of screening passengers.
  5. To desist from all VIP protocol except for persons using the Presidential Lounge and the heads of diplomatic mission only.
  6. To improve coordination and the exchange of information between various security agencies.
  7. To reduce the over-abundance of state security personnel deployed in passenger screening processes and to limit it to a small and well-trained core.
  8. To impose stiff penalties of jail terms without any option of a fine, for persons convicted of smuggling or facilitating smuggling through action or omission.

 

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