Note 21-27 to:
Graumans, Anne
The European Union - South Africa negotiations: the sting is in the tail. - Amsterdam: Netherlands institute for Southern Africa, 1998 (July). - (NiZA occasional papers; No. 1)



21   The catch is in Appendix XXXVI of the Lomé Convention which stipulates that the BLNS should apply the same customs tariff treatment to imports from the EU as to those from South Africa (Graumans, 1997(a):19).

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22   The JCCC (Joint Committee of the ACP-EU) must define what and where cumulation of the rules of origin can occur

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23   This is notwithstanding the EU foreseeing LLDCs belonging to a regional trade grouping to enter into FTAs with the EU. The EU acknowledges that this will require a greater adjustment effort from these LLDCs. This needs to be taken into account when assessing their needs for financial assistance and flanking measures (transitional aid, macroeconomic assistance, sectoral assistance, etc).

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24   One of the basic principles of co-operation between the EU and other regions is the sovereignty of the region to decide on the composition of the group. The ACP group is institutionalised in the Georgetown Agreement of 1975 and thus can decide to co-operate as a group with the EU.

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25   Within SADC countries carry the responsibility of sectors. This is to avoid a central bureaucracy. However, it has also meant as Buthelezi has argued that '...in all SADC operational co-ordination programmes there has been an absence of a specific framework for the regionalisation of economic activities, that is, a lack of an intra-regional perspective in planning, design and implementation' (Buthelezi, 1997:16).

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26   One needs to stress the impact of structural adjustment programmes on preventing SADC to formulate a region-wide strategy regarding tariff liberalisation. A paradox is appearing since in the current situation SADC is expected to negotiate trade agreements with powerful bodies as the EU.

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27   The problems with renegotiating a bilateral trade agreement between Zimbabwe and South Africa illustrate this. Domestic opposition existed in South Africa to renew the bilateral agreement. Major employment losses in the textile industry of Zimbabwe were the result. Another example is the use of non-tariff barriers by the South African government to protect its industry against competition from the BLNS countries.

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